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The Setting of the Problem

Animals are used both as a source of
energy for the production and transportation
of agricultural products, and also as e1emselves a source of food and fiber.
Many now
question the justifiability at least
of
treating animals as themselves consumable
prooucts.

trinsic importance of humans and other animals.
What is the basis of ethical standing
or of a being's deserving consideration in
itself?
First, let us get straight on the
question.
William K. Frankena raises a related, issue in an instructive way:

Specific practices of animal agriculture
have come under fire, as well as the entire
phenomenon of raising and managing animals in
order to eat them or to wear their skin, fur,
or fibers.
Those who have attacked such
dealings with nonhumans have employed strategies designed to challenge one of two claims:
either that nonhumans have no
intrinsic
e~cal
significance,
deserve no serious
attention on their own merits, or else ~t
humans are more important than other animals.[l] Defenders of humans have met these
attacks head-on.[2]

The point is ~t, in every ethics
whatsoever, there are certain sorts
of facts about certain sorts of
~ngs that are ultimate considerations in determining what is morally good or bad, right or wrong, and
the question now is: what sorts of
things are such that certain facts
about them are the final determinants, directly or indirectly, of
moral rightness or virtue?[3]

This discussion will be devoted mainly
to these two issues: the intrinsic and reIative importance of human and nonhuman animals.
I shall present a detailed defense of
a view rather like the position taken by
Kant, arguing ~t ethical standing is to be
reserved for ethical agents, excluding nonhumans and some humans.
This leaves only a
derivative irn}::.ortance for those who are not
ethical agents.
Later, I use these conclusions to rrake clear the complexity in assessments of particular animal agricultural
practices and veganism.
II.
Let

lie

PHILOSOPHY

The Problem

begin with the issue of the
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Frankena is concerned with moral standing,
while I am interested, more generally, in
e~cal standing, whether moral, legal, prudential, or whatever. Still, with that difference in mind, the way Frankena raises the
issue is very useful:
what are the ultimate
considerations in determining what is justifiable or not, and what beings manifest
those?
Every ethic begins somewhere, saying

in8

How might we make this selection?
Some
have thought that this question amounts to
asking how might we find what the correct
e~,ic counts as seeds of justifiable
conduct
and the possessors of ethical standing? [6]
That view of the matter, however, rests upon
a fundamental confusion.

that the objects of certain aims or certain
pursuits themselves are justifiable to realize or engage in and this is not due to their
relation to some other justifiable aim or
pursuit.
These are the beginning points of
justification in the ethic in question.
At
least, they are the beginning points, conflicts aside:
the sources of what Ross considered prima facie duty and what consequentialists might call a, but not necessarily the, right or optimific act.[4] The characterization of these beginning points would
fill out the antecedents of the lOClst general
norms of the ethic, ti10se hypothetical claims
to the effect that if an aim or pursuit is of
a certain sort, then it is justifiable, conflicts aside.
These norms, in turn, would
enter into the justification of other norms
of the ethic (by what Paul Taylor calls "validation" ) and into the justification of particular acts, either directly or tirrongh
derived norms (by the process Taylor calls
"verification"). [5] These ultimate considerations, conflicts aside, I call "the seeds of
justifiable conduct" in an etiUc.

The problem should be familiar to philosophers.
In order to select the methcx:l ti1at
will deliver the correct view of seeds of
justifiable conduct (or in order to know that
a methcx:l will fail to do so), we would have
to have some way to attest to the reliability
of the methcx:ls we select fran.
This in turn
re:IUires that we already have some grasp on
what really are seeds in a correct etillc.
Grasping the seeds of justifiable conduct,
however,
amounts to knowing the (basic)
norms, and so, the ethic we seell:. Thus, to
select a methcx:l to identify the correct ethic
requires that we first have in hand the correct ethical theory.
That, of course, is
incoherent. Thus, it seems that nothing will
satisfy getting at the correct etiUc.

Different
ethics identify
different
seeds, classical utilitarianism, for example,
selecting pleasure and the absence of pain as
the basis of what John Stuart Mill calls its
"theory of life," while religiously oriented
ethics, for example, select among various
possible versions of enlightenment or beatitude.

Picking between different conflicting
views of seeds and who has standing is not to
be taken as a matter of selecting the correct
view of these matters. [7] It is not, then, a

Once we know what the seeds of an ethic
are, we can identify conditions or beings who
do (or might) manifest those seeds, and then
these will have standing or be considerable
within ti1at ethic.
That is, they will be
conditions or beings whose presence, sustenance, and pursuits can be justified (conflicts aside) without reference to anytiUng
else other than their manifesting (or perhaps
being able to manifest) the seeds of justiHable conduct.

The only thing to say seems to be ti1at
we decide what aims are seeds and what beings
have standing.
We simply must make up our
mind without any pretense of meeting a test
of truth or of satisfying an aim of accuracy.
But what guide do we have for our decision?
Is there any? Are these decisions just arbitrary, a matter of what feels right?
Are
they to be settled, then, by hurling ad haninems such as "species chauvinist" or "crazy
environmentalist"? As it turns out, there is
at least one perspective on the selection of
seeds which is alternative to searching for
the correct ethic and which does not just
abandon the problem to caprice.

matter of discovery, of our learning what is
really the case etiUcally and then suiting
our beliefs about acceptable standards to the
facts. What then is it?

Questions of the justifiability of animal agriculture begin with questions of what
are the seeds of justifiable conduct and in
what are they manifested.
Are they found
only in beings within the domain of humans,
or does their range extend beyond to nonhumans as well?
To assess animal agriculture,
we first need to select among the various
possible views of seeds and, in the bargain,
among the various possibilities for assigning
ethical standing.

The suggestion comes fram Rudolf Carnap's radical Kantian approach to questions
of what exists. [8] Carnap recognizes that if
we stand outside of all commitments to what
kinds of things might exist, and so outside
of all standards or tests of what does exist,
we have lOClVed outside all correct (or, as he
9
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all. An ethic without fX)int, however, is one
whose adoption would be arbitrary.
Without
point, an ethic would make no impact upon
anyone.
There would be nothing attributable
to any impact that would make any difference
to anyone and so might be counted in its
favor or against it.
Adopting it then, or
not doing so, for that matter, would be arbitrary, and so the ethic would not be acceptable as opposed to unacceptable. Thus, if an
ethic is acceptable, then it has point.

put it, "theoretical") answers to questions
of what there is. From such a vantage fX)int,
questions about what kinds of things there
are should be viewed as external questions.
These call for a decision not a discovery.
And for Carnap, their decision is a "practical" one, based wholly on what answer will
most effectively and efficiently serve the
purfX)ses of those asking what exists:
purfX)ses, e.g., of constructing a theory of the
foundations of mathematics or of empirical
science.

This result pu ts limits on what an acceptable ethic might say about seeds and
standing.
The problem from this functionalist perspective is not how to find what norms
correspond to some ethical reality but, rather, to consider what we would need to count
as seeds of an ethic, any ethic, i f it is to
have any impact at all upon us or others.
A
minimally acceptable ethic will have those
features, including seeds, which allow it to
function in some way such that it makes some
differffi1ce to our lives or those of others.

A.pplied to our problem, this suggests
the following. We have just seen that trying
to find the ethically correct picture of
seeds and that of the assignment of standing
is incoherent.
The proper determination of
these matters is external to any specific
ethic.
The answers will provide us with
norms of what is justifiable,
conflicts
aside, and of who or what has ethical significance on its own merits.
There is no correct answer to such puzzles, an answer internal to some view of what is justifiable
and of who or what has intrinsic significance.
We need a decision, not a discovery.

What might be the seeds of justifiable conduct and who or what might have standing in
such a functional ethic? That is the problem
we need to address.

And following Carnap's radical Kantian lead,
we would make the decision on the basis of
what could serve well the purfX)ses for which
we have ethical codes.
We WGuld ask, how
would seed aims and ethical standing be specified in a code llOst appropriate to the aims
of anyone embracing any ethic. This, I shall
call "the functionalist approach" to our
problem.

III:

My main contentions in this section are
two:
first, some ethics do have fX)int, and
in fact, there is one characterization that
fits any point that any ethic might have.
Second, having this COIlIllOn feature does place
restrictions upon what aims and pursuits are
acceptably counted as seeds.
As we shall
see, these restrictions are quite general,
but still extremely important here.
As it
turns out, they deny ethical standing to
nonhuman animals, indeed, to any but ethical
agents.

Should we follow Carnap's functionalist
lead in deciding ufX)n an ethic to guide us in
matters of animal agriculture?
Yes. otherwise, the ethic we select would be fX)intless,
and so it would be unacceptable.
Let me
explain.
To identify the fX)int of an ethic,
as I understand that here, is to single out
what it is about, the code that allows it to
play a role making some difference to our
lives and those of others, to have some function for some being.
An ethic's fX)int is
whatever makes possible its having some impact ufX)n our lives, an impact that is attributable to the ethic itself or to its operation.

To make gocxi these contentions, we need
to begin with an account of the fX)int of any
ethic. Kant, in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, reminds us thatethics
always have their impact through influencing
choice and behavior by considerations appealing to reason and bearing on the justifiability of our options. [9] The first main point
of my argument is this Kantian one: if there
---is ~ impact that is attributable to the
operations of ~ code of ethics itself, then
it is an im]?3.ct that the code has by direct~ choice and beha~ior through the
application of its norms to the options facing

Now, whether an ethic has some point or
not is quite important to being acceptable.
If a code is acceptable, as oPfX)sed to unacceptable, then its adoption is not arbitrary,
not just something that would not matter at
BETWEEN THE SPECIES
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agents, through ~ directing influence upon
the aims ~~ pursuits of agent~ an influence
11e code exerts by provid~ng Eeason~ pro and
, Jntra the options open ~~ the agent. Let me
refer to that claim as "the functionalist's
principle."
According to this principle,
then, the most general impact of ethics is to
facilitate the choice and pursuit of options
by providing reasons marking aims and pursuits open to us as justifiable or not.

that principle would be unacceptable.
To say that the point of ethics is lost
on youngsters and nonhuman animals, or that
ethics are witl10ut point for them, is not to
say that how they are treated does not matter
ethically. [13] The next question, then, is
what are we to conclude from the functionalist's principle?
Might a being have ethical
standing d.t'd ethics still be without point
for it?
Or is it that any being on which or
whom ethics is lost lacks ethical standing
and is important only because its welfare is
tied up with the aims and pursuits of those
for whom ethics do have point?

This c:ontention seems so fundamental to
all of ethical theory that i t is difficult to
know just how to argue best for it.
Ethics,
as Frankena puts it, are action guides, and
how else might they serve in this capacity
but t.hrough providing reasons for or against
the various options facing agents.
It matters not how we see the operations of these
reasons, for example, in a cognitive way, as
did Kant, of as emotively persuasive, in the

Ethics that have point satisfy the functionalist's principle, their impact oaning
through an influence on aims and pursuits due
to the justifying reasons of the ethics'
norms.
Clearly then, if an ethic is to influence choice and behavior through reasons,
the influence will be exclusively on those
whose choices and behavior can be directed by
such reasons, namely, ethical agents.
It
will be the aims of those agents that are
singled out as justifiable or not, the aims
of those agents which the oode marks as acceptable or not.
otherwise, the normative
guidance would fallon deaf ears.

various ways that C. L. Stevenson sketched
for us.[lO]
The conclusion is the same:
ethics include, no matter what else, evaluations more or less general in scope, [11]
evaluations that provide reasons pro or contra.
And, if an ethic so understood is to
have an impact, it must be the impact of the
direction of reason upon an agent's aims and
pursuits.
The functionalist's principle records this point and, as such, seems uncontroversial.

Thus, aims 'identified as seeds by the
ethic's basic norms will belong to ethical
agents.
They might be directed toward the
well-being of non-ethical agents (as we shall
. make much of later), but the direction of an
aim is irrelevant to whether there is any
point to marking it justifiable or not. Whether there is any such point depends on whether those aims belong to ethical agents.
The fact that seeds in a oode are the aims of
ethical agents is what allows that oodepoint.
It is this that is necessary to its
not being arbitrary. It is this that assures
its, minimal acceptability.
So, any ethic
acceptable in ·so far as it has point will
locate its seeas ~ng the aims ~~ ethical
agents (those ~ to being <pided by the
~tifying: reasons it provides). [14]
Let me
call that the "rationalist's principle."

Perhaps, beyond relying on jus't that
much, however, it would be wise to note an
intolerable
consequence of rejecting the
functionalist's
principle.
Ethics
are
thought to have no point for very young infants and for nonhuman animals.
This is
simply because their aims and pursuits are
not open to the influence of justifying reasons.
Even Tom Regan, that most thorough
champion of animal rights, grants this (as do
Peter Singer and Bernard Rollin, for exam:)le). He notes that nonhumans are not etilical agents and that the impact ethics would
have on nonhumans must come through the influence of its justifying reasons upon ethical agents. [12] But that is just to say that
the point of ethics de]?E'.nds on their influencing choice and behavior through such rec,sons.
It is just to assert e1e functionalist I s principle. A rejection of that principle would leave open the question of whether
ethics have point for young children and
nonhuman animals.
Since no serious party to
the debate over animal agriculture seems to
take that question as open, a rejection of

We have noted that the ethical agents of
oodes with poin~ are restricted to the group
of humans (thoGgh are not necessarily coextensive with that group). Thus, the implication of the rationalist's principle is that
the seeds of any ethic with point will be
aims and pursuits of humans, as opposed to

11
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While we are at it, however, we can say
even more on behalf of this minimal animal
lover's ethic. Notice that there is a second
aspect to an ethic's being non-arbitrary.
Adopting an ethic without point would be
arbitrary, because there is nothing to say
for or against adopting it as 0Pp?sed to no
ethic at all.
Another aspect of arbitrariness can enter in when we choose between two
--------or ~re ethics, all of which have point but
which offer inconsistent guidance on the same
matter.
In this second way, adopting an
ethic would be arbitrary i f it restricted,
for no reason, the seeds of justifiable conduct and the aims that can win conflicts.
Adopting such restrictions would be biased
and so question begging against those aims
not counted as seeds or allowed to win a
conflict.
Only our minimal animal lover's
ethic is not arbitrary in this second way.

nonhumans. [15]
Since ethical standing belongs to whatever manifests the seeds of
justifiable conduct, it is some hwnans and
not other animals that exclusively enjoy such
standing.
Nonhuman animals,
!:hen~ lack
ethical significance on their own, at least
in any ethic that might have any impact upon
our lives or those of others.
What significance nonhuman interests and well-being have
in !3uch an ethic is due !~ their being 00ject~ of
the aims and pursuits of ethical
agents.
If these aims are seeds of justifiable conduct in an ethic, then, conflicts
aside, they are justifiable to pursue without
reg~ to other considerations.
As objects
of such aims, nonhuman animal welfare, freedom, and so one have a kind of fundamental
----------importance.
Still, this is an iIllflOrtance
nonhumans have because of the standing of
those ethical agents who are their champions.
It is derivative upon the ~rnport:. of these
human, as opposed to nonhuman, champions.
This result I shall refer to as "the humanistic restriction of ethical standing."

--

IV:

Clearly, we would beg the question unless we allowed nonhumanly directed aims the
status of seeds of justifiable conduct.
A£ter all, what could serve as a reason for
ruling them out?
Whatever could do the job
would have to imply that excluding them is
justified for some reason.
As we saw above,
however, no reasons can be given for saying
that certain aims are or are not seeds. Such
a claim is external to all ethics and itself
constitutive of justifying reasons.
Thus,
denying seed status to nonhumanly directed
aims would be without reason and so question
begging.
The animal interest advocate would
reject it, and insisting upon it would be
arbitrary, biasing the discussion in an unacceptable way.

Amplification of the Answer

Those with ethical standing are, then,
among the group of humans.
What, however,
about the significance of nonhumans as competitors in conflict with humans?
What of
the relative import of humans and nonhumans?
The interests of nonhumans might end up
more important than competing human interests
in certain codes.
This could happen in any
ethic that allows nonhumanly directed airns as
seeds and has a norm(s) of conflict resolution that allows such aims to win out over
the competition.
Do acceptable ethics operate this way?

The same can be said against an ethic
whose basic norm(s) of conflict resolution
would not allow nonhumanly interested aims to
win out in conflicts with other aims.
This
norm(s) of conflict resolution is the fundamental ethical consideration that tells us
which of two or more incompatible courses of
action is justifiable. C?nsidering its role
as an ultimate ethical consideration, there
is nothing that would provide a justifying
reason for such a norm, nothing whose assertion or support does not already assume the
acceptability
of what that norm claims.
Thus, if a basic standard of conflict resolution excludes certain aims from winning--for
example, nonhumanly interested aims--it would
be arbitrary or question begging, and so,
unacceptable.

The answer is "yes," but to make good
the point, we must say more about when ethical codes are acceptable.
All we have said
thus far is that a code is acceptable only if
it has some point.
So far, so good, for surely an ethic
that had nonhumanly interested aims as seeds
and whose norm( s) of conflict resolution
allc:JWErl such aims to win out over the competition would be an ethic with point.
In
particular, it would provide guidance on how
to settle conflicts between such aims and
ones that are humanly interested, guidance
which could give highest marks to the nonhumanly directed aims in some circwnstances.
BEIWEEN THE SPECIES
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only conflict resolution

principle

dures used in animal agriculture.
Perhaps
the most notorious case is that of veal production.
Veal calves are generally kept in
quarters that virtually eliminate all but

which would avoid this problem gives every
=nflicting aim an equal chance at winning
out over its canpetitors. It ac=rds as much
importance to anyone aim as it does to every
other competing aim, as much to nonhumanly
directed aims as to exclusively humanly directed aims.
Now, if a principle is to ac-

some head movement and the freedom to lie
down.
Social =nduct is essentially precluded.
Their diet is basically liquid.
TI,eir environment is often dark.
Their life
is invariably short.
The object of all this
is to prenuce quickly al,d e=nom:i.c:ally a
tendi=r meat product for a limited but =ntinuing market. The animal is treated just as d
tissue factory whose concern to ~,e producer
amounts to how 'Nell it perforras in putting on
flesh in a short period of tiJne.

=rd equal importance to every canpeting aim
and yet resolve conflicts, it will proceed by
urging whatever course of action will maximally allow for the pursuit of all airns affected in the conflict situation. [16]
If,
for example, anirnals are needed for protein
to such an extent that ra~s~ng them for
slaughter and =nsumption would be what would
,nax.iJnally facilitate the aims and pursuits of
all those affected, animal lovers and not,
then that would be the non-question begging
way to settle the dispute.
If not, then it
would not be.

All of this sounds diabolical, as though
certain fanners have set out to contrive
management practices that will ~1wart every
natur.al striving of the animal incompatible
with a higher profit. However, a closer look
indicates that this view of the matter is, at
best, only mostly correct.
In the first
place, most producers of veal would not even
engage
in the practice,
regardless
of
procedures used, if the choice were up to
them.
Veal calves are mostly the male offspring of dairy cows, a progeny which is a
problem to the dairy farmer.
What is the
farmer to do with such an animal?

What, then, about an ethic =unting
nonhumanly interested aims as seeds of justifiable conduct and allowing them to win out
in conflicts with other aims?
Only this
minimal animal lover I s ethic will avoid arbitrariness on the two counts we have isolated.
It will have point by providing guidance on
issues where we need it, and only the guidance it provides will be non-question begging.
More than avoiding arbitrariness

Asking the farmer to raise and keep the
animals would be imposing a serious financial
burden on them. Without further regulations,
this is a burden they can be expected to try
to externalize.
Since the dairy industry is
already heavily subsidized, however, it is
hard to imagine what most farmers would be
able to do besides just cheat and destroy
immediately those animals that would have
been raised for veal.

enters

into the acceptability of an ethic.
But we
shall stop here, for now.
This much should
create a presumption in favor of this minimal
animal lover's ethic and against alternatives
to it. It is now time to apply this ethic to
what we should say about =nflicts over raising animals for food and fiber.
V:

Applications of the Answer
Regulating the market so that only certifiable male dairy cow off-spring =uld be
sold for slaughter as calves and req~iring
that they be sold by the animal, rather than
per pound, for an amount equal to expenses
might well serve to renove all the incentive
there is prese,tly for the use of intensive
techniques.
The practices described above
are devoted to getting as much out of the
animal as possible by selling it per pound in
the shortest period (usually 2 to 3 months) •
If there were no profit in such techniques,
they would pass, assuming the critics are
corcect about the veal producers' basic motivation. Any scheme like this, however, would
also have to require that the farmers keep

This question turns out to be an enormously complex and pa.rtially factual inquiry.
It amounts to this:
just what treatment of
nonhuman animals in agriculture will be such
as to maximally serve the aims and pursuits
of all those ethical agents affected by the
conflict's out=rne.
Confronted by such a
problem, it would be silly to give the appearance of providing a final answer.
I
shall say, instead, only a bit, trying to
make clear the complexity of some of the subissues.

that

Consider, first, sane of the charges
have been levelled against the proce13
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the animals healthy so that selling calves by

intensive practices are unjustifiable and
ought to be eliminated.
Some producers and
production experts have defended them, often
on a standard of animal welfare measuring
only animal yield for profit.

the animal would not lead to neglect.
Regulations that would do all this would no doubt
be expensive to ad-ninister and intrusive.
Who would pick up the costs or put up with
the intrusions?

Clearly, hawever, we lack the facts to
decide the issue using a defensible ethic
such as the one outlined above. For example,
what would be the impact on the industry
structure if we were to remove the profit
incentive supposedly fueling the engine of
such practices?
WOuld specialized producers
be hurt the most and driven to take their
capital elsewhere?
Or would a larger sector
of the farming ccmnunity be hurt, impairing,
in the end, a source of food going far beyond
pork and important to all of us?
Perhaps we
could get along just fine in the end with no
more intensive hog production, letting those
who have the taste pay more? Do we know?

Perhaps, then, we should attempt to reeducate tastes, thereby undermining the market for veal? This, if effective, eventually
would eliminate the unwanted intensive production, all right. However, the fanner will
still have the animals to contend with.
Thus, in all likelihood, we would have traded
those objectionable practices for the immediate disposal of animals that would have been
raised for the veal market.
What should we do, then, in the face of
intensive veal production practices? I, like
the so-called "animal lovers," find these
practices objectionable, because, like them,
some of my aims are directed toward not hanning most other sentient creatures when this
can be avoided at an ethically justifiable
cost.
Intensive veal production techniques
seem to involve putting the animals in circumstances they would avoid if they could,
and on this basis, the practices seem harmful
to the animals considered as sentient creatures with a life of their own.
The loss of
avoiding this hann would be monetary and
gustatory, losses that are surely repairable
and bearable, if we choose to repair and bear
them. The protein of animals raised in these
ways is not needed to maximally facilitate
the aims and pursuits of all those in active
conflict over the practices, let alone all
those affected by the outcome of the conflict.
One wonders what justification could
be given for such practices if we appeal to
an ethic that has point and is not question
begging at the foundations?
But, then, we
just do not yet have all the facts, do we?

Jim Harter, Animals: 14~~
Copvright-Free-rrIUstra ~ons.
New York: Dover, 19'79

The question whether to make consumers
pay for less intensive production techniques
looms large also when we turn to the wellknown conditions of intensive egg and poultry
production.
In the face of the decline of
the family farm, as well as the urban- and
suburbanization of the populations of Western
industrialized countries, the intensification
of egg and poultry production has served to
provide a stable and relatively inexpensive
source of complete protein.
What would be
the cost of replacing those intensive management techniques if we measured that price in
terms of impainnent of the aims and pursuits
of the ethical agents touched by t,he conflict?
Again, I think that we do not have a
good idea of what to say.

Although there are differences in the
animals, the management practices, and the
market size, some of the same sorts of points
can be made about the treabnent of brood
sows. Unlike the veal calf, the brood saw is
actively sought in order to function as a
reproductive factory, which involves considerable restraint in movement. Intensive hog
raising practices, including saw restraint,
mark a change over previous, more free-ranging management techniques and were introduced
in order to increase productivity and profit.
Critics have urged that, at the least, these
BEIWEEN THE SPECIES
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same question complicates the

as-

ces, the balance of diets with respect to the
arrount of usable protein in them, the channels of public information that would be
needed in order to convert people's diets,
the livelihood of those now making a living
from the production of animal food and fiber,
and the international relations centered on
the production and distribution of animal
food and fiber.

sessment of intensive production techniques
in the case of beef.
On the one hand,
it
,",ould be lOClst surprising if an acceptable
~thic could
justify the practice of grain'inishing cattle in intensive feed-lot situaions.
As Lappe p.Jints out, the grain could
.,e used elsewhere, [17] or else the land
used
to produce it could be tUDled to other products that could be used elsewhere. The food
produced without this grain would be every
bit as good a source of protein and to some,
every bit as palatable as that produced with

With a consortium of experts, no doubt
we could carry out these assessments.
But
surely, we are not yet in a p.Jsition to apply
an acceptable ethical theory to the question
of veganism.

it.
Further, note that the beef produced
non--intensively on open range in many areas
of the United states and other countries,
such as Australia, makes productive for the
benefit of ethical agents land that would
otherwise not be usefuL
(The same is true
for what is even a better use of such arid
range, namely, sheep production for wool,
lamb, and mutton.) Here, then, it seems that
non-intensive techniques avoid indefensible
waste while at the same time being productive
for the overall benefit of ethical agents.

VI:

Conclusion

Agriculturalists and, lnore imp.Jrtantly,
the legislat~rs, regulators, economists, and
economic elite who control the plans of agriculturalists need guidance on what are ethically defensible practices (if there are any)
of animal food and fiber production.
Philosophers can inform this guidance at its
ethical base and by clarifying the epistemic
and conceptual aspects of the basis.
But we
cannot do it all.
As I have tried to illustrate, these questions lead us into enorrrously complex factual matters.
.At least, this
is so if our duties to animals are indirect.

On the other hand, however, if a world
source of complete proteins is the main issue, then intensive beef production, where
economical and conducted without the \Yaste of
grain finishing, is likely to turn out to be
defensible.
And, how could an assessment of
animal agriculture ignore the fact that in
much of the world, human malnutrition is due
to a lack of available whole or complete
proteins?

My arguments show that these duties are
indirect.
To deny this is to advocate an
ethic without p.Jint or one question begging
in its foundations. Let us not be so foolish
or biased as to do either.
And, let us not
act as though operating alone, philosophers
can settle questions requiring complex enpirical inputs.
In either event, we would be
taking serious matters less than seriously.[18]

Intensive beef production also might
seem desirable in the face of social and
environmental consequences of nonintensive
beef production in areas of cheap lands and
p.Jlarization of economic groups, areas such
as are found in Central (and perhaps South)
America. In those places, intensification of
beef-raising might be able to accompany land
reform that would leave the peasant agriculturalists better off econanically, and in
some cases could provide the opp.Jrtunity to
reduce environmental depredation.
Again,
however, the p.Jint to conclude with is that
we just do not know about all of this.
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